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It is a central claim of the national competitiveness literature that firms exploit the com-
parative advantages of their environment by choosing to pursue the product market 
strategy that is facilitated by national financial- and labour-market institutions. Other-
wise, so goes the argument, firms are punished in that strategies receiving no insti-
tutional support are less successful and therefore not sustainable in the long run. My 
analyses of pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom challenge 
these arguments on the choice and success of competitive strategies. Given that differ-
ent measures of strategy success do not indicate that the latter is in line with national 
institutional advantages, I develop an alternative explanation for the strategy choices of 
firms. On the basis of my qualitative interviews with managers, I argue that technologi-
cal opportunities to transform inventions or imitations into marketable products are a 
primary concern when entrepreneurs choose their firm’s strategy.
Zusammenfassung
Es ist ein zentrales Argument der Literatur zur nationalen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von 
Unternehmen, dass sich letztere die Wettbewerbsvorteile ihrer institutionellen Umge-
bung zu Nutze machen, indem sie diejenigen Produktstrategien wählen, die durch die 
jeweiligen nationalen Finanz- und Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen gefördert werden. An-
sonsten, so ein weiteres Argument der Literatur, werden Firmen dadurch abgestraft, 
dass institutionell nicht gestützte Strategien langfristig weniger erfolgreich und daher 
nicht von Bestand sind. Die im Rahmen dieses Projekts durchgeführten Untersuchun-
gen von Pharmazieunternehmen in Deutschland, Italien und Großbritannien lassen 
Zweifel an diesen Argumenten zu Wahl und Erfolg von Wettbewerbsstrategien entste-
hen. Da verschiedene Indikatoren von Strategieerfolg nicht darauf hindeuten, dass na-
tionale Wettbewerbsvorteile die Strategiewahl beeinflussen, wird eine alternative Erklä-
rung entwickelt, wie Unternehmen Wettbewerbsstrategien wählen. Auf der Grundlage 
von qualitativen Interviews mit Managern wird aufgezeigt, dass die technologischen 
Möglichkeiten eines Unternehmens, Erfindungen oder Imitationen in marktfähige 
Produkte zu verwandeln, von wesentlicher Bedeutung dafür sind, welche Strategie ein 
Unternehmer wählt.
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1 National institutions as drivers of strategy choice and sustainability?
Beginning with the trade theorem of Heckscher and Ohlin (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 
1933), the literature on national corporate competitiveness has developed in several dis-
ciplines and now embraces strands as diverse as neo-liberal theory (Sinn 2005), strate-
gic management studies (Porter 1990), theories on national innovation systems (Lund-
vall 1992b; Nelson 1993; Pavitt/Patel 1999), and the literature on varieties of capitalism 
(Hall/Soskice 2001b; Amable 2003; Hancké et al. 2007). Despite their different foci, all 
these strands agree that economies are differently endowed with input factors which, in 
turn, are required for particular competitive strategies. Whereas the originators of this 
literature consider how the abundance of labour and capital influences corporate pro-
duction decisions (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933), its subsequent promoters distinguish 
between different types of production factors and illustrate how they facilitate strate-
gies of radical product innovation, high-quality production and low-cost production, 
respectively. Because national corporate-governance and labour-market institutions are 
found to influence the availability of these crucially required factors, the four above-
mentioned strands of the national competitiveness literature also concur in the claim 
that firms choose to exploit the comparative institutional advantages of their economy 
and embark on the strategy facilitated by their institutional environment.
More concretely, the institutional environment of coordinated economies, such as that 
of Germany and Sweden, is said to facilitate competition through product quality. Col-
lective bargaining procedures between the social partners not only entail comparatively 
high and homogeneous wages; they also facilitate an education and training system 
that provides employees with highly specific vocational skills. The latter are at the root 
of extraordinary labour productivity and high-value-added strategies. Given that the 
corporate-governance system grants shareholders important control rights, managers 
cannot take major financial decisions at short notice, which is necessary to rapidly in-
vest in, or divest from, radically innovative projects. Yet firms do have access to ‘patient’ 
capital, required for incrementally innovative projects, because major stakeholders – 
such as banks, suppliers, employees, and the founding family – also tend to be major 
shareholders. Cooperation-enhancing labour-market institutions and corporate gover-
nance systems thus constitute important comparative advantages that motivate firms to 
specialize in strategies of high-quality production.1
The opposite applies to liberal economies, such as those of the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States, where the institutional setting is found to motivate competition 
I wish to thank Steven Casper, Colin Crouch, Guido Möllering, David Soskice, Rikard Stankiewicz, 
Wolfgang Streeck, Pieter Vanhuysse, and Raymund Werle for stimulating discussions and their com-
ments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to Fabio Pammolli for granting me access to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PHID) and to Laura Magazzini for assisting me in sampling it.
1 Proponents of this argument are, in particular, Porter (1990: 355–382); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Hol-
lingsworth (2000); Estévez-Abe et al. (2001); Hall/Soskice (2001a: 36–44); Vitols (2001); Ama-
ble (2003); Casper/Matraves (2003); Casper/Whitley (2004); Sinn (2005); see also Lindgaard 
Christensen (1992); Freeman (1992); Keck (1993).
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through radical innovation strategies. Because collective bargaining processes are decen-
tralized, it is difficult to put in place an education and training system in which firms 
collaborate to provide trainees with specific skills. On the other hand, wages are flex-
ible. High bonuses can therefore be paid to motivate employees to relentlessly develop 
radically new innovations. Furthermore, deregulated financial markets give firms easy 
access to share capital. This capital, however, needs to be invested in radical innovation 
projects promising high returns in the short run, because if the profit expectations of 
shareholders are not fulfilled, the latter rapidly withdraw funds, as they have only re-
duced monitoring capabilities for tracking how their investment is used. Flexible labour 
markets and deregulated corporate governance systems thus seem to offer compelling 
comparative advantages for strategies of radical product innovation.2
Finally, firms in low-investment economies, such as those of Italy, Spain or Greece, are 
likely to specialize in the pursuit of low-cost strategies. Where labour-market institutions 
allow for comparatively low wage levels, employers are unlikely to participate in sophis-
ticated education and training programmes, whereas employees, once they have finished 
compulsory schooling, often decide to start working rather than to invest in further 
education. Whenever low wage levels are coupled with non-transparent financial-mar-
ket institutions, firms are furthermore likely to engage in low-cost production, as share 
capital and bank credits – required for radical and incremental innovation alike – are 
difficult to obtain. Firms in low-investment economies seem thus best advised to exploit 
the cost advantage of the economy, by choosing to specialize in low-cost strategies.3
The view of firms as ‘institution-takers’ on which this reasoning is based, makes it dif-
ficult to explain how a substantial number of firms can pursue competitive strategies 
that are not supported by national institutions. Therefore, the national competitive-
ness literature remains puzzled with the question of how radically innovative high-tech 
industries can develop in rigid or low-investment economies like those of Germany or 
Italy. And yet, a highly innovative biotech industry has, in fact, grown in both countries 
since the mid-1990s (Ernst & Young 2006; Pozzali 2004). Sticking to their constraining 
view of national institutions, competitiveness scholars argue that the attempt to engage 
in radical product innovation in these economies can be of a temporary nature only. In 
the long run, such attempts are condemned to failure. In other words, radical innova-
tion strategies are expected to be less successful in rigid and low-investment economies 
like Germany or Italy than in flexible economies like the UK, and are therefore not sus-
tainable in the long term.4
2 See, in particular, Porter (1990: 482–507); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Estévez-Abe et al. (2001); Hall/
Soskice (2001a: 36–44); Vitols (2001); Amable (2003); Casper/Matraves (2003); Casper/Whitley 
(2004); see also Lindgaard Christensen (1992); Freeman (1992); Walker (1993); Hollingsworth 
(2000).
3 See Estévez-Abe et al. (2001: 175–176); Amable (2003: in particular 102–114, 197–213); see also 
Porter (1990: 421–453); Malerba (1993); Trento (2005).
4 For proponents of this argument, see Hall/Soskice (2001a: 17–21); Vitols (2001: 355–359); Hall/
Gingerich (2004); Casper (2007).
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This paper challenges the arguments on both strategy choice and strategy success. Be-
ginning with analyses of the latter, I show that the success (measured in terms of both 
accounting performance and the sustainability of the initial legal status) with which 
firms pursue different strategies in the UK, Germany, and Italy is not influenced by the 
national institutions of these economies. Given that the decision to pursue strategies 
unsupported by national institutions is not punished by limited success, the question of 
alternative explanations for strategy choice arises. Systematic comparisons of entrepre-
neurial decision-making processes show that firms choose their strategy on the basis of 
technological opportunities, i.e. on the basis of inventions made by scientists and the 
facilities available for developing these inventions into marketable products. Depend-
ing on their innovation results, entrepreneurs thus decide to engage in radical product 
innovation, incremental product innovation or low-cost imitation.
I illustrate these points through quantitative and qualitative analyses of pharmaceutical 
firms – including biotech, traditional pharmaceutical, and generics firms – in Germany, 
Italy, and the UK. The reasons for this empirical focus are twofold. With regard to the 
choice of industry, it is possible to identify the competitive strategies of pharmaceutical 
firms in a straightforward way through the scientifically established notion of a New 
Chemical Entity (see section 2). With regard to the choice of countries, it is important 
to note that patent legislation, as well as pharmaceutical health and safety regulation, 
is strict but homogeneous throughout the EU zone following the establishment of the 
European Medicines Agency in 1995 (Casper/Matraves 2003: 1868; BAH, 2006; EMEA, 
2006). Since this paper aims to test the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature on 
the impact of national institutions on competitive strategies, it was essential to control 
for legislative factors that influence corporate strategies. Consequently, only pharmaceu-
tical firms in the most institutionally disparate EU member states that have been legis-
latively harmonized have been investigated. According to the national competitiveness 
literature, the economies that offer the most facilitative institutions for radical innova-
tion, high quality, and low-cost strategies are, respectively, the UK, Germany, and Italy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first analyses whether firms in different 
economies specialize in the same competitive strategy. Finding this not to be the case, 
section 3 enquires into strategy success by analysing whether firms perform less well 
and are less sustainable if they choose to pursue competitive strategies that are not sup-
ported by national institutions. Given that empirical evidence does not support this 
idea, section 4 proposes an alternative explanation for strategy choice. By examining 
three sets of very different firms, the section illustrates that they all agree on one central 
point: entrepreneurs choose their firm’s strategy on the basis of technological opportu-
nities. Section 5 summarizes and interprets the various findings.
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2 One economy, one competitive strategy?
To obtain a benchmark for strategy stability on the one hand, and strategy choice on the 
other, we need to understand to what extent firms in the same economy specialize in the 
same competitive strategy, as suggested by by the national competitiveness literature. To 
this end, we first need to identify different strategies. In line with the literature, I under-
stand a competitive strategy to be a process that leads to the emergence of a good which, 
in turn, gives the producing firm a sustainable advantage on the market.5 Deductive rea-
soning combined with insights from the national competitiveness literature teach us that 
a firm can obtain a sustainable advantage either from selling an entirely new good or from 
selling an already existing product. However, if the product is already known to the cus-
tomer, it has to be of a better quality or cheaper than rival products. Hence, a sustainable 
advantage results from selling a radically new, an incrementally new, or a cheaper standard 
good. Accordingly, I distinguish between three competitive strategies: Radical Product 
Innovation (henceforth RPI), based on a radical technological innovation; Diversified 
Quality Production (henceforth DQP), based on an incremental technological innova-
tion; and Low-Cost Production (henceforth LCP), based on technological imitation.
This conceptual distinction can be applied in a particularly straightforward way to 
pharmaceutical firms6 in order to identify their competitive strategies due to the scien-
tific notion of a New Chemical Entity (henceforth NCE). Simply put, an NCE consti-
tutes a chemical entity which had not yet been discovered. It is scientific practice to 
indicate whether active ingredients or excipients of a pharmaceutical product constitute 
an NCE, a modification of an already discovered chemical entity, or simply an imita-
tion. Using the classification of pharmaceutical products according to the newness of 
their employed chemicals, I propose the following differentiation between competitive 
strategies (see Bottazzi et al. 2001: 1162–1167). Pharmaceutical firms inventing drugs 
based on an NCE pursue RPI strategies, whereas firms improving already discovered 
chemical entities engage in DQP. Finally, firms which do not engage in R&D, but focus 
on imitating innovations made by others, pursue LCP strategies.
5 See Porter (1980: chapter 2); see also Porter (1985: chapter 1); Hall/Soskice (2001a: 14–17); 
Estévez-Abe et al. (2001: 148–149); Casper (2001: 397–401); Lundvall (1992a: 10); Heckscher 
(1919); Ohlin (1933: 7); Sinn (2005: 18–19).
6 The generic term of a ‘pharmaceutical firm’ is commonly used in the literature for any company 
that is active in the pharmaceutical industry. Accordingly, the firm is assigned to the industry on 
the basis of the good it produces: a pharmaceutical product. The distinction between a ‘biotech-
nology’, a ‘traditional pharmaceutical’ and a ‘generics’ firm refers to the technological approach 
of the pharmaceutical company in question. In so far, biotechnology firms employ the most 
modern technology on the level of the cell and sub-cell to create industrially useful substances. 
Although traditional pharmaceutical firms sometimes apply methods used in biotechnology, 
they mostly make use of experimental and, thus, less deliberate approaches to drug design. Fi-
nally, generics firms are least technology-intense, as they do not engage in any research or clini-
cal development activities, but instead imitate drugs as soon as their patent protection expires 
(see Drews, 2000; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Pammolli et al., 2002; Muffatto/Giardina, 2003; Wittner, 
2003). Throughout this paper, I use these commonly accepted definitions of a pharmaceutical, 
a biotech, a traditional pharmaceutical and a generics firm.
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The privately-owned Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PHID), which is developed 
and administered by a group of researchers at the University of Siena (Italy), offers 
the most complete empirical basis for identifying the competitive strategy of pharma-
ceutical firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK.7 Being one of the largest pharmaceutical 
databases worldwide, it keeps track of 16,751 pharmaceutical projects carried out by 
3,522 firms and public research organizations in seven countries.8 The latter include 
Germany, Italy, and the UK, in addition to France, Japan, Switzerland, and the United 
States.9 For these countries, any firm is recorded as soon as it has been involved in at 
least one pharmaceutical project that has reached the stage of preclinical development 
since the 1980s. Therefore, firms whose pharmaceutical projects are/were not granted 
patent protection are also included in the database. However, firms that do not engage 
in R&D but imitate the pharmaceuticals of competitors are not recorded. Finally, phar-
maceutical firms are considered only if their projects translated into therapeutic drugs 
curing or alleviating human diseases. Firms that are active in the service sector, such as 
platform-technology suppliers, are not considered.
Importantly, though, a new drug is often not developed by a single firm. Instead, the 
process leading to the launch of a new product is characterized by a remarkable division 
of labour (see Gambardella et al. 2001: 36–53). Whereas biotech firms tend to specialize 
in upstream research activities, downstream development activities are typically taken 
over by traditional pharmaceutical firms (see Orsenigo et al. 2001; Bottazzi et al. 2001; 
Owen-Smith et al. 2002; Pammolli et al. 2002). The PHID database takes this division of 
labour into account by distinguishing between the developers, licensors, and licensees of 
pharmaceutical products. A developer is a firm with a fully integrated value chain carry-
ing out all stages on its own. A licensor, by contrast, initiates a project which ultimately 
translates into a new drug. However, focusing on upstream activities (i.e. on discovery, 
preclinical and early clinical development), the licensor decides at a certain point to 
licence its discovery to another firm, which continues the drug development process. 
Accordingly, a licensee focuses on the stages of (late) clinical development, registration, 
and marketing in order to translate the respective discovery into a marketable drug. 
This distinction makes it possible to identify RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists as follows:
RPI strategists are  – developers, or the licensors of pharmaceutical projects that 
translate into a drug based on an NCE. Since the discovery of an NCE is made by the 
licensor, the latter is radically innovative irrespective of the stage at which it decides 
to out-license the pharmaceutical project.
7 The PHID database is constantly updated. All figures reported in the following analysis refer to 
November 2004.
8 The PHID database identifies the nationality of a firm on the basis of the location of the firm’s 
headquarters.
9 To be precise, the PHID database covers 67 countries. However, the number of pharmaceutical 
projects registered in the remaining 60 countries is too small to provide representative results.
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Following this logic, a firm pursues a DQP strategy whenever it is the  – developer or 
licensor of a pharmaceutical project which improves on a previously discovered 
chemical entity. In addition, a firm also pursues a DQP strategy if it in-licences a 
pharmaceutical project based on an NCE at the stage of clinical development. At 
that moment, the previously unknown chemical entity has been discovered. Accor-
dingly, it is the task of the licensee to improve the entity in such a way that its effec-
tiveness and dosage are optimized. In sum, both the licensees of a clinical develop-
ment agreement and the developers or licensors of an improved drug pursue a DQP 
strategy, as they are not radically but incrementally innovative. 
This leaves us with a third group of firms in-licensing pharmaceutical projects with  –
the aim of registering and marketing radically or incrementally new drugs. These 
firms are similar to generics firms in that they avoid expensive research and develop-
ment activities. Hence, their strategy consists in producing and selling drugs at the 
lowest-possible cost.
Table 1 shows the results of this sampling strategy when applied to those British, Ger-
man, and Italian pharmaceutical firms which have been involved in at least one phar-
maceutical project since 1985.10 A detailed list of the firms that qualified as RPI, DQP, 
and LCP strategists is provided in the Appendix.11
Contrary to the expectations of the national competitiveness literature, Table 1 does not 
provide empirical support for the idea that the majority of firms in the same political 
economy specialize in the same competitive strategy. While 47.5% of pharmaceutical 
firms pursue an RPI strategy in the UK, 39.4% of firms pursue this strategy in Germany, 
and 34.5% of firms do so in Italy. DQP strategies, in turn, are pursued by 51.5% of 
German, 37.9% of Italian, and 42.5% of British firms. Finally, the share of firms pursu-
ing an LCP strategy is 27.6% in Italy, 10.0% in the UK, and 9.1% in Germany. In other 
words, the strategy patterns identified are very similar for the UK, Germany, and Italy. 
However, Table 1 also shows that firms in different economies show slight preferences 
for one of the three strategies. The share of British firms engaged in radical product 
innovation is 6.3 percentage points higher than the average. Similarly, the probability 
of pursuing a DQP strategy is 7.4 percentage points higher for a German firm than for 
the sample’s average company. Finally, Italian firms show a preference for low-cost pro-
duction, as the share of Italian firms engaged in this strategy is 12.9 percentage points 
higher than the average. Yet, a crosstab analysis of the strength of association between a 
10 Given that it takes on average 14 years to develop a pharmaceutical product (Muffatto/Giardina 
2003: 108–109), I have limited the sample to the last 20 years in order to cover a sufficiently long 
time span, while eliminating outdated results.
11 Each of those nine international pharmaceutical firms which were found to pursue – in two 
separate business units – an RPI strategy on the one hand and a DQP strategy on the other 
are counted as two individual cases. For a more detailed description of the sampling approach 
underlying the results reported in Table 1, see Herrmann 2008; Herrmann forthcoming: chap-
ter 2.
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firm’s location and the probability with which a specific strategy is pursued shows that 
differences in specialization patterns are too weak to produce statistically significant 
results (χ² = 5.996 [2 cells = 22.2% with expected count less than 5]; p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .171; p > .10). These findings run counter to the expectations of proponents of the 
specialization argument, as they indicate that neither the majority nor a statistically 
significant plurality of firms pursues the same competitive strategy within the same 
economy.
3 Strategy success
The results obtained are telling in two respects. First, they indicate that firms do not 
choose to pursue that competitive strategy for which national institutions provide 
the required input factors. British pharmaceutical firms do not specialize in RPI even 
though deregulated financial and labour markets offer easy access to share capital and 
employees with general qualifications (see footnote 2). Neither do German firms chiefly 
engage in DQP only because regulated financial markets provide them with patient 
capital and rigid labour markets motivate employees to acquire specific qualifications 
(see footnote 1). Moreover, Italian firms do not specialize in LCP even though wage lev-
els are low in comparison to those of other European Monetary Union member states, 
and thus provide a source of ‘cheap’ labour, while non-transparent financial-market 
institutions make access to larger sums of capital difficult (see footnote 3).
Second, these findings provide empirical support for a phenomenon mentioned earlier: 
the fact that radically innovative biotech industries have developed in rigid and low-
invest ment market economies like Germany and Italy. Seeking to explain this enigma 
from a functionalist perspective, the national competitiveness literature holds that radi-
cally innovative industries in these economies perform less well and are thus not sustain-
able in the long run (see footnote 4). Paying tribute to this argument, it must be said that 
the previous analyses only demonstrate that British, German, and Italian pharmaceuti-





Low cost  
producers (LCP)
Total
No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms
UK 19 47.5 17 42.5 4 10.0  40 39.2
Germany  13  39.4  17  51.5  3  9.1  33  32.4
Italy  10  34.5  11  37.9  8  27.6  29  28.4
Total  42  45  15 102 100.0









Source: PHID (November 2004).
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cal firms pursued an RPI, DQP, or LCP strategy at some point between 1985 and 2004. 
However, this static overview says nothing about the success with which RPI, DQP, and 
LCP strategies are pursued in different institutional environments. It may be that firms 
choosing a non-conformist strategy are punished for their decision with failure in the 
long run. In other words, whenever firms neglect to exploit the advantage of pursuing 
the institutionally facilitated strategy, they are less competitive and sooner or later fail.
To shed light on this question, the following two subsections analyse how successful RPI, 
DQP, and LCP firms are in different institutional environments. In so doing, section 3 
considers two different indicators of corporate success: accounting performance and 
change in legal status. In other words, subsection 3.1 addresses strategy success from a 
synchronic perspective by comparing various accounting ratios of RPI, DQP, and LCP 
pursuers in Germany, Italy, and the UK. Subsection 3.2 takes up a diachronic analysis of 
strategy success, investigating the sustainability of the initially pursued strategy. It asks 
the question: Are firms more likely to merge, be acquired, or go bankrupt if they pursue 
strategies that are not supported by national institutions?
The firm sample for these analyses is, mostly, the one I derived from the PHID database 
(see section 2). To obtain more representative results when assessing strategy success on 
the basis of the PHID sample, I increased the latter in two ways. First, I added generics 
firms, which are not included in the PHID database because they abstain from R&D 
activities. I thus included the entire population of British, German, and Italian generics 
producers which, in November 2004, could be identified as genuinely national firms, 
having their headquarters in, and concentrating their activities on, the national terri-
tory of the respective country (Wittner 2003: 51–54, 70–73, 133–134). Hence, I added 
six British,12 nine German,13 and two Italian14 generics producers to the dataset and 
classified each of them as a low-cost producer. Second, I added German and Italian 
biotech firms, as they were underrepresented in the initial sample in comparison to 
their British counterparts (see tables A.1 – A.3 of the Appendix). The reason for this is 
that the British biotech industry began to develop in the 1980s – much earlier than its 
German and Italian counterparts, where most biotech firms were founded, respectively, 
in the mid-1990s and around the turn of the millennium. Therefore, many German 
and most Italian biotech firms had not yet brought a pharmaceutical project beyond 
the stage of preclinical development and, hence, were not yet registered in the PHID 
database when I sampled the latter in November 2004. To obtain a more homogeneous 
sample, I randomly added three German15 and eight Italian16 biotech firms, using data 
12 Namely, CP Pharmaceuticals, Generics (UK), Kent Pharmaceuticals, Sterwin Medicines, Sussex 
Pharmaceuticals, and Tillomed Laboratories.
13 Namely, Aliud Pharma, Azupharm, Betapharm Arzneimittel, CT Arzneimittel, Hexal, Lichtenstein 
Pharmazeutica, Merck Dura, Ratiopharm, and Stada Arzneimittel.
14 Namely, DOC Generici and Dorom.
15 Namely, DeveloGen, Ingenium Pharmaceuticals, and Sirenade.
16 Namely, Axxam, BioXell, Newron Pharmaceuticals, Nikem Research, Novuspharma, Primm, Shar.
dna, and Siena Biotech.
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provided by Ernst & Young (2002: 15–19) and the ‘Italian Biotech Database’ of Venture 
Valuation (2006) as a sampling basis. I identified the firms’ strategy (RPI or DQP) by 
comparing the classification of Ernst & Young (2002: 15–19) with that of Knut Lange 
(2006), by consulting the firms’ web pages, and by talking to their representatives.17 
With the addition of these 17 generics and 11 biotech firms, the initial sample of 102 
pharmaceutical firms was increased to 130.
Synchronic analyses of strategy success
Do firms perform less well if they pursue a strategy that is not supported by national 
institutions (see Hall/Soskice 2001a: 17–21; Hall/Gingerich 2004)? From a synchronic 
perspective, one way to answer this question is to compare the accounting performance 
of the 130 aforementioned RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists. More precisely, I compared 
how these firms perform in six accounting ratios which are among the most impor-
tant indicators used by analysts to evaluate the financial conditions of a firm. They 
include (a) return on shareholders’ funds, a measure of corporate profitability indicating 
how much profit a firm has generated with the money that shareholders have invested; 
(b) return on capital employed, a ratio that reveals the profitability of a firm’s capital 
investments; (c) profit margin, a ratio of profitability that indicates how much out of 
every dollar of sales a firm obtains in earnings; (d) current ratio, a liquidity ratio that 
measures a firm’s ability to pay back its short-term liabilities (debt and payables) with 
its short-term assets (cash, inventory, and receivables); (e) solvency ratio, an indictor 
used to measure a firm’s ability to meet long-term obligations; (f) gearing, an indica-
tor that explains how a firm finances its operations either through outside lenders or 
through shareholders, whereby firms with a high gearing – that is, with more long-term 
liabilities than shareholder equity – are considered speculative. As a rule of thumb, one 
can say that firms perform better, the higher they score on each of these indices – with 
the exception of their gearing, where the opposite applies.
All ratios were obtained from the AMADEUS database, a privately-owned dataset of 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains financial information on nine million public and pri-
vate companies in 38 European countries (Bureau van Dijk 2004). It was possible to 
obtain accounting ratios for 73 of the 130 pharmaceutical firms included in the overall 
sample. Before grouping these 73 firms according to their strategy and country, I cal-
culated each accounting ratio for each firm as an average value of the past five years in 
order to correct for temporary peaks.
17 On the basis of these insights, I classified DeveloGen, Ingenium Pharmaceuticals, Sirenade, BioX-
ell, Newron Pharmaceuticals, Novuspharma, Shar.dna, and Siena Biotech as RPIs, and categorized 
Axxam, Nikem Research, and Primm as DQPs.
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Table 2 presents the results. To find empirical support for the argument that the success 
of competitive strategies is influenced by national institutions, Table 2 should reveal 
that RPI strategists perform particularly well in the UK, whereas DQP pursuers perform 
better than average in Germany, and LCP firms outperform their peers in Italy. Interest-
ingly, though, this is not the case. For each of the six accounting ratios, British RPI strat-
egists, German DQP pursuers, and Italian LCP firms are usually outperformed either by 
firms pursuing different strategies in the same country or by firms pursuing the same 
strategy in different countries – or even on both accounts. Crosstab analyses confirm 
the findings presented in Table 2. To run these analyses, I calculated for each firm and 
each accounting ratio whether the respective RPI, DQP, or LCP strategist performed 
better or worse than the average 73 firms for which data could be obtained. Crosstab 
analyses of the respective average performance indicators with the firms’ countries and 
competitive strategies unambiguously led to the same results. If statistically significant 
deviations are observable at all, they are not in line with the predictions in the national 
competitiveness literature.18 These results indicate that the success of competitive strat-
egies is not influenced by the institutional environment within which firms operate.
Another noteworthy observation to be made on the basis of Table 2 is that RPI strategists 
perform overall rather poorly in all profitability ratios, including the return on share-
holders’ funds, return on capital employed, and the profit margin. This finding, in turn, 
18 Detailed results of the crosstab analyses performed can be provided by the author upon request.
























RPIs UK 11 –55.10 –58.13 –4.34 3.86 53.84 74.68
DQPs UK 12 49.37 59.30 5.63 3.41 52.22 106.43
LCPs UK 7 –16.02 –84.27 –6.74 1.53 34.78 62.83
RPIs Germany 5 –34.07 –14.89 –16.72 7.89 66.77 36.01
DQPs Germany 8 28.03 24.48 12.43 3.03 46.58 88.19
LCPs Germany 3 169.49 42.22 12.95 1.31 25.29 856.68
RPIs Italy 8 –8.03 –7.30 2.36 3.19 43.34 196.84
DQPs Italy 13 20.77 18.50 10.33 1.50 40.37 78.32
LCPs Italy 6 48.39 62.35 9.06 1.28 17.47 466.02
RPIs overall 24 –35.03 –31.78 –4.92 4.48 53.03 112.07
DQPs overall 33 32.93 34.02 9.13 2.56 46.18 91.02
LCPs overall 16 42.92 –0.32 2.88 1.40 26.51 362.87
Total or average 73 12.78 5.57 4.13 2.94 44.12 159.77
a: Return on shareholders’ funds = profit or loss before tax/shareholders’ equity.
b: Return on capital employed = profit or loss before tax + interest paid/shareholders’ equity + non-current 
liabilities.
c: Profit margin = profit or loss before tax/operating revenue.
d: Current ratio = current assets/current liabilities.
e: Solvency ratio = shareholders’ funds/total assets.
f: Gearing = non-current liabilities + loans/shareholders’ equity.
Source: AMADEUS, sampled in December 2004 (Bureau van Dijk 2004).
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indicates that RPI, DQP, and LCP strategies are characterized by a distinct investment-
return profile, which is particularly evident in the case of radical product innovators. 
Because it takes years before investment in research and development of pharmaceuti-
cal products becomes profitable, newly established RPI strategists do not usually make 
a profit in the first years of their existence. This seems to explain why their profitability 
ratios are comparatively low. However, the possibility that competitive strategies differ 
in their risk-return profile also indicates that comparisons of accounting ratios between 
firms pursuing different strategies might be of limited help in understanding whether 
national institutions influence strategy success, because part of the variations among 
strategies in these indicators might stem from the differences in risk-return profiles 
rather than from differences in the institutional environment.
It is thus useful to cross-check the findings presented in Table 2 with indicators that 
eliminate the possible influences of different risk-return profiles. To this end, the AMA-
DEUS database offers additional indicators that can be taken as synchronic measures of 
strategy success. In the so-called peer report of the database, a firm is ranked in com-
parison to its ten most direct competitors according to six economic items on the one 
hand and six accounting ratios on the other. While the accounting ratios are the same 
as those described in Table 2, the six economic items are (a) the firm’s operating revenue; 
(b) its profit or loss before tax; (c) the annual cash flow; (d) the firm’s total assets; (e) its 
shareholders’ funds; and (f) its number of employees. Depending on how well a firm 
performs relative to its ten most direct competitors, it is assigned a score from 1 to 11, 
whereby higher scores indicate better performance.
Table 3 gives an overview of the peer performance of those 73 pharmaceutical firms for 
which data could be obtained from the AMADEUS database. For reasons of simplifica-
tion, Table 3 does not report the scores of each of the twelve peer indicators separately. 
Instead, a firm’s average position has been calculated for the six economic items (col-
umn 3) and the six accounting ratios (column 4). These two performance indicators 
of RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists in Germany, Italy, and the UK are reported on the 
left-hand side of Table 3. The right-hand side ranks the respective groups of firms ac-
cording to their overall peer performance, which, in turn, was calculated by averaging 
out the scores obtained in economic items and accounting ratios. In order to correct for 
temporary peaks, each peer performance indicator was calculated as an average value of 
the past five years for which data was available.
Table 3 also shows that RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists in Germany, Italy, and the UK 
achieve fairly similar positions on both the economic items index (column 3) and the 
accounting ratio measure (column 4). On a scale from 1 to 11, the average positions 
range from 3.65 (DQP pursuers in the UK) to 5.89 (LCP firms in Germany). In other 
words, all the pharmaceutical firms observed perform worse than at least three, but bet-
ter than six, of their most direct competitors – irrespective of the strategy they pursue 
and the country within which they are located. From the perspective of an entrepreneur, 
this result might be reassuring to the extent that the pursuit of any strategy seems to 
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have about the same chances of success. From the perspective of the national com-
petitiveness literature, though, this result is troubling because it indicates that national 
institutions do not directly influence the success of corporate strategies. This idea is 
confirmed by the last three columns of Table 3, which rank the different groups of firms 
according to their overall peer performance. Although one should keep in mind that 
differences between the individual positions are minor, it is striking to find British RPI 
strategists, German DQP pursuers, and Italian LCP firms amongst those four groups of 
firms that perform least well. This finding, again, militates against the idea, commonly 
advanced in the literature, that pharmaceutical firms perform less well if they pursue a 
strategy that is not supported by national institutions (see Hall/Soskice 2001a: 17–21; 
Hall/Gingerich 2004).
Diachronic analyses of strategy success
It would be premature, however, to dismiss, purely on the basis of synchronic analyses, 
the idea that national institutions influence strategy success, as it may be that firms per-
form equally well at a certain point in time. Once corporate performance is considered 
over time, it may turn out that some strategies fail more often than others, depending 
on the institutional environment within which they are pursued. In this subsection, I 
Table 3 Performance of RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists relative to their  





















Ø peer perfor m-
ance in economic 
items and  
accounting ratiosc
RPIs UK 11 5.73 5.26 DQPs UK 12 4.19
DQPs UK 12 3.65 4.73 DQPs Italy 13 4.48
LCPs UK 7 4.87 4.42 LCPs UK 7 4.64
RPIs Germany 5 4.39 4.95 RPIs Germany 5 4.67
DQPs Germany 8 4.56 5.83 RPIs Italy 8 4.74
LCPs Germany 3 5.89 4.50 LCPs Italy 6 4.86
RPIs Italy 8 4.44 5.04 DQPs Ger. 8 5.19
DQPs Italy 13 4.19 4.77 LCPs Germany 3 5.20
LCPs Italy 6 5.28 4.44 RPIs UK 11 5.50
RPIs overall 24 4.99 5.12
DQPs overall 33 4.08 5.01
LCPs overall 16 5.21 4.44
Total or average 73 4.62 4.92 Total 73 4.77
a: On a scale from 1 to 11, average of firms’ ranking in operating revenue, profit or loss before tax, cash flow, 
total assets, shareholders’ funds, and number of employees.
b: On a scale from 1 to 11, average of firms’ ranking in return on shareholders’ funds, return on capital em-
ployed, profit margin, current ratio, solvency ratio, and gearing.
c: On a scale from 1 to 11, average of peer performance in economic items and of peer performance in ac-
counting ratios.
Source: AMADEUS, sampled in December 2004 (Bureau van Dijk 2004).
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thus take up diachronic analyses of strategy success by enquiring into the frequency 
with which firms merge, are acquired, or go bankrupt. Are the initially pursued strate-
gies more sustainable – that is, less susceptible to mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcy 
– if they are supported by national institutions providing the required input factors 
(see Vitols 2001: 355–359; Casper 2007)? To answer this question, I first address the 
sustainability of competitive strategies on the basis of the previously employed PHID 
dataset of 130 pharmaceutical firms. I then countercheck the findings on the basis of an 
additional dataset comprising biotech firms only.
Does the PHID sample provide empirical support for the idea that competitive strate-
gies are less sustainable unless firms pursue RPI strategies in the UK, DQP strategies 
in Germany, and LCP strategies in Italy? To answer this question, a retrospective check 
on each of the 130 pharmaceutical firms was carried out to see whether they have gone 
bankrupt, merged, been acquired, or kept their original legal status in the course of the 
last twenty years (i.e. between 1985 and 2006). Table 4 summarizes the results. Because 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) do not necessarily constitute instances of corporate 
failure, whereas bankruptcy does, Table 4 makes the following distinction. Columns 2 
to 5 list all instances of bankruptcy and M&As separately; these are then added up and 
reported in columns 6 and 7 as instances of change in legal status. Columns 8 and 9 
report the remaining number and percentage of firms that did not experience a change 
in legal status. Taken together, all instances of status change and status stability lead to 
the overall number of firms surveyed, shown in columns 10 and 11.
Irrespective of whether M&As are perceived as instances of corporate success or failure, 
Table 4 indicates that firms go bankrupt, are acquired, or merge independent of the 
competitive strategy they pursue within a given institutional environment. For all in-
stances of bankruptcy, it is particularly evident that national institutions providing re-
quired input factors do not influence the sustainability of competitive strategies. While 
bankruptcy is a rare event in general, the only instance observed for Germany concerns 
a firm that pursued a DQP strategy. In Italy, bankruptcy is – in relative terms – most 
widespread among LCP pursuers. Only RPI strategists in the UK show signs of strategy 
sustainability in line with the expectations of the national competitiveness literature.
To assess statistically whether differences in the sustainability of competitive strate-
gies vary significantly between countries, I carried out two crosstab analyses. As might 
have been expected on the basis of Table 4, the association between a firm’s country, its 
strategy, and the stability of this strategy (measured in terms of ‘bankruptcy,’ ‘M&A,’ and 
‘legal status stability’ on the one hand,19 and in terms of ‘legal status change’ and ‘legal 
19 More concretely, the key indicators obtained are 
 – for the UK: χ² = 2.140 (4 cells = 44.4% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .153, p > .10
 – for Germany: χ² = 6.314 (6 cells = 66.7% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .265, p > .10
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status stability’ on the other20) is not strong enough to produce statistically significant 
results. Synchronic analyses therefore cast doubt on the idea that national institutions 
influence strategy success, even when the latter is understood in terms of the sustain-
ability of a firm’s legal status. In other words, firms seem to fail, or to change or main-
tain their legal status irrespective of the country in which they pursue RPI, DQP, and 
LCP strategies.
Albeit only for firms pursuing RPI strategies, it was possible to countercheck these find-
ings by means of the ‘VentureXpert’ database of Thomson Financial (2004). This data-
base provides detailed information on a representative sample of firms in many West-
ern economies that have received venture capital since the early 1980s (Bernard 2006). 
Because data can be sorted by country and industrial activity, it is possible to isolate 
those biotech firms that have obtained venture capital in the UK, Germany, and Italy. 
These firms can be assumed to pursue an RPI strategy for two reasons. First, tables A.1, 
A.2, and A.3 show that the majority of RPI strategists are biotech firms (see Appendix). 
Second, several studies illustrate that institutional share capital in general, and venture 
capital in particular, constitute the most important source of finance for RPI pursuers 
(see Bottazzi/Da Rin 2002; Gompers/Lerner 2004: chapter 12; Kanniainen/Keuschnigg 
2005; Herrmann forthcoming: chapter 3). Firms that are active in the biotech industry 
and have received venture capital are very likely to pursue an RPI strategy.
 – for Italy: χ² = 4.988 (6 cells = 66.7% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .253, p > .10
20 More concretely, the key indicators obtained are 
 – for the UK: χ² = .468 (1 cell = 16.7% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s V 
= .101, p > .10
 – for Germany: χ² = 3.706 (3 cells = 50.0% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .287, p > .10
 – for Italy: χ² = 3.866 (3 cells = 50.0% with expected count less than 5), p > .10; Cramer’s 
V = .315, p > .10
Table 4 Changes in the legal status of RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists
 
Group of  
firms





 No. %  No. %  No. %  No. %  No. %
RPIs UK 1 5 6 32 7 37 12 63 19 100
DQPs UK 1 6 6 35 7 41 10 59 17 100
LCPs UK 2 20 3 30 5 50 5 50 10 100
RPIs Germany 0 0 2 13 2 13 14 87 16 100
DQPs Germany 1 6 2 12 3 18 14 82 17 100
LCPs Germany 0 0 5 42 5 42 7 58 12 100
RPIs Italy 1 7 2 13 3 20 12 80 15 100
DQPs Italy 1 7 0 0 1 7 13 93 14 100
LCPs Italy 1 10 3 30 4 40 6 60 10 100
RPIs overall 2 4 10 20 12 24 38 76 50 100
Source: PHID, sampled in November 2004; changes occurred between 1985 and 2006.
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While the sample obtained from VentureXpert for both Germany and the UK is repre-
sentative, the one obtained for Italy must be completed. Given that the Italian biotech 
industry started to take off around the turn of the millennium,21 many firms were not 
yet included in the VentureXpert dataset when I sampled it in October 2004. To make 
up for this shortcoming, I consulted the ‘Italian Biotech Database’ of Venture Valua-
tion (Venture Valuation 2006). This database provides the most complete list of biotech 
firms which have received, or constitute attractive opportunities for, venture invest-
ment. In June 2006, it contained 34 firms. Like their British and German counterparts, 
these firms can be expected to pursue RPI strategies for the two previously mentioned 
reasons: they are active in the biotech industry, and they are (potential) recipients of 
venture capital. Yet, unlike VentureXpert, the Italian Biotech Database does not provide 
systematic information on bankruptcy, M&As, and firms that have gone public. To re-
veal whether the firms in this database have a history of mergers or acquisitions and to 
discover possible additional instances of bankruptcy, I consulted experts from the Ital-
ian biotech industry, various reports (Chiesa 2004: 14–20; Fornasiero 2004; Muffatto/
Giardina 2003: 119), and the companies’ web pages to identify the firms that had gone 
bankrupt or public, that had merged, or that had been acquired.
Table 5 provides an overview of the information obtained and illustrates the extent 
to which British, German, and Italian RPI strategists have changed their legal status 
21 The majority of today’s most successful biotech firms in Italy were founded between 1999 and 
2003 (see Venture Valuation 2006).




No. % No. % No. %
In registration 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0
Active investment 101 80.2 140 90.9 27 79.3
Went public 12 9.5 4 2.6 4 11.8
Acquisition 8 6.3 2 1.3 2 5.9
Merger 3 2.4 6 3.9 1 3.0
Bankruptcy 1 0.8 2 1.3 0 0.0
Σ 126 100.0 154 100.0 34 100.0
Successful RPIsa 114 90.5 144 93.5 31 91.1
Ambiguous RPIsb 11 8.7 8 5.2 3 8.9
Unsuccessful RPIsc 1 0.8 2 1.3 0 0.0
Σ 126 100.0 154 100.0 34 100.0
Legal status stabilityd 114 90.5 144 93.5 31 91.1
Legal status changee 12 9.5 10 6.5 3 8.9
Σ 126 100.0 154 100.0 34 100.0
a: Sum of biotech firms which were in the process of registration in 2004, which have remained unchanged 
since their establishment (active investment), or which went public between 1985 and 2004.
b: Sum of biotech firms which merged or were acquired between 1985 and 2004.
c: Biotech firms which went bankrupt between 1985 and 2004.
d: See 'a' above.
e: Sum of biotech firms which merged, were acquired or went bankrupt between 1985 and 2004.
Sources: VentureXpert, sampled on 19 October 2004: changes occurred between the mid-1980s and 2004. 
Italian Biotech Database, sampled on 18 June 2006: changes occurred between the mid-1990s and 2006.
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since the mid-1980s. Whereas the upper section of Table 5 (lines 2 to 7) provides more 
detailed insight into corporate changes, the middle section (lines 9 to 11) regroups the 
respective events into successful, unsuccessful, and ambiguous cases. The lower section 
(lines 13 and 14) gives a summary of the initial events (lines 2 to 7) by distinguishing 
merely between legal status stability (line 13) and legal status change (line 14). It should 
be noted that this sample presumably conveys an overly optimistic impression of strat-
egy sustainability because it only includes (potential) venture-capital recipients. Having 
been subject to the scrutiny of venture capitalists, these firms are more likely to be en-
gaged in promising research projects than the average biotech firm in Germany, Italy, or 
the UK. However, this bias towards RPI stability is symmetric, so that actual failure can 
be assumed to be systematically higher in all three countries to the same extent.
The figures presented are telling in that they again cast doubt on the argument ad-
vanced in the national competitiveness literature that RPI strategies are unsustainable 
in Germany (see Vitols 2001: 355–359; Casper 2007). Contrary to this claim, Table 5 
shows that the aggregate figures of legal status sustainability are strikingly similar for 
British (90.5%), German (93.5%), and Italian (91.1%) RPI strategists alike. I tested the 
statistical robustness of this observation through several crosstab analyses. In line with 
the previous analyses, I tested the associational strength between the country of RPI 
strategists and their sustainability, whereby I measured the latter in terms of ‘strategy 
success,’ ‘ambiguity,’ and ‘failure’ on the one hand,22 and in terms of ‘legal status change’ 
and ‘legal status stability’ on the other.23 The results obtained show that the scores are 
not statistically significant for either χ² or Cramer’s V, whereby Cramer’s V received low 
scores. These indicators thus lend additional statistical support to the observation that 
RPI strategies are about equally sustainable in Germany, Italy, and the UK.
4 Strategy choice
Given that section 2 showed that firms in different types of economies pursue RPI, DQP, 
and LCP strategies to the same extent, and given that the previous analyses indicate that 
strategies are successful even if they are pursued in institutionally hostile environments, 
it can be ruled out that entrepreneurs base their strategy choice on institutional consid-
erations. But what, then, drives an entrepreneur’s choice of competitive strategy? In this 
section I attempt to provide an alternative explanation. To this end, it should be noted 
that choice and change of competitive strategies are synonymous events from an analyti-
cal point of view, as they are determined by the same cause. The use of one or the other 
22 The key indicators obtained are χ² = 2.037 (4 cells = 44.4% with expected count less than 5), 
p > .10; Cramer’s V = .057, p > .10
23 The key indicators obtained are χ² = .907 (1 cell = 16.7% with expected count less than 5), 
p > .10; Cramer’s V = .054, p > .10
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term simply depends on a firm’s stage of development. When a company is set up from 
scratch, it must choose the strategy it wishes to pursue. An established firm, by contrast, 
already pursues a strategy that it may wish to change at a certain point in time. Yet the 
reasons why a newly founded firm chooses a particular strategy and an already estab-
lished company changes its strategy are the same. In this section, I discuss instances of 
strategy choice and change to roughly the same extent. 
Drawing on insights I gained from interviewing CEOs and managers of selected RPI, 
DQP, and LCP firms,24 I suggest that entrepreneurs base their choice of competitive 
strategy on technological opportunities – that is, on the inventions made by scientists 
and the facilities available for developing these inventions into marketable products. 
To illustrate this argument, I will discuss several particularly revealing cases, presenting 
them in three groups. The first group consists of three firms that resemble each other 
in all respects but three: the institutional environments in which they are situated, the 
technological opportunities available to them, and the strategies they pursue. The sec-
ond group comprises four firms that are prototypical examples of German and Italian 
biotech firms. Differing in a variety of ways, their common feature is the extent to which 
technological opportunities have influenced the firms’ strategy choices. The third group 
is made up of three companies that have changed their strategy at a particular point in 
time. Although the direction and moment of change as well as the firms’ institutional 
environment differ, the most important driver of strategy change is the same in all three 
cases: technological opportunities.25
Similar firms, choice of different competitive strategies
A particularly revealing example of how the choice of competitive strategy is influenced 
by technological opportunities is provided by three biotech firms which, for reasons of 
confidentiality, shall be called Chrome Ltd., Chrome GmbH, and Chrome Srl. These firms 
are strikingly similar in many respects. In addition to being active in the biotech indus-
try, they are active in the same therapeutic area of vaccines against bacterial pathologies. 
Although they function independently in making their short- and medium-term deci-
sions, all three firms are wholly owned by the same US corporation. Furthermore, they 
are similar in size, employing 750, 850 and 1,100 people, respectively. All have a fully 
integrated value chain which includes an R&D department, production facilities, mar-
keting and sales structures, and administrative support functions. However, the three 
companies differ in two crucial aspects. First, they are situated in three different institu-
24 For reasons of confidentiality, I refer to these interviews with two or three initial letters that 
stand for the country in which the interview was carried out (‘Ger’ for Germany, ‘It’ for Italy, 
and ‘Uk’ for the United Kingdom), combined with an abbreviation for the strategy pursued by 
the interviewee’s firm and a figure indicating the number of the interview.
25 This section draws from interviews carried out between March 2004 and March 2006. Changes 
after March 2006 are not taken into consideration here.
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tional environments: Chrome Ltd. in the UK, Chrome GmbH in Germany, and Chrome 
Srl. in Italy. Furthermore, they differ in the competitive strategies they pursue. Whereas 
the German and British firms are engaged in development-oriented DQP strategies, the 
Italian company specializes in research-oriented RPI (UkDQP1; ItRPI2; GerDQP2).
Because this strategic orientation runs counter to the expectations of the national com-
petitiveness literature, I asked human resources managers from each firm about the 
reasons for their company’s strategy choice. Interestingly, the three interviewees agreed 
in their answer: the choice or change of competitive strategy was motivated by the tech-
nological opportunities of each firm; namely, the extent to which pharmaceutical in-
ventions gave rise to hopes for the development of radically or incrementally new prod-
ucts. When the US holding company bought the Italian affiliate in 1992, the latter had 
a long-standing history in pharmaceutical research, made possible through its exten-
sive R&D facilities and its links to internationally renowned research institutes. These 
technological capacities had not only produced radically new pharmaceuticals but also 
raised hopes for further radical innovations. Accordingly, the Italian affiliate continued 
to pursue a research-focused RPI strategy after it was acquired (ItRPI2). The situation 
was different for both the German and the British affiliate. When the two firms were 
bought by the US holding company, their R&D facilities and their academic networks 
augured incremental rather than radical innovations. Therefore, the German biotech 
firm continued to pursue a development-focused DQP strategy (GerDQP2), whereas 
its British counterpart changed its strategy from RPI to DQP (UkDQP1).
Different firms, choice of similar competitive strategies
Further evidence of firms choosing their strategies on the basis of technological op-
portunities is provided by the emergence of the German and Italian biotech industry 
in general, and by two German and two Italian biotech firms in particular. To preserve 
their confidentiality, the German firms shall be called Melareen AG and Intrapharma AG, 
the Italian firms Belle SpA and Neverpharma SpA. These firms are not only examples of 
Germany’s and Italy’s most successful biotech firms in the early years of the new millen-
nium; they are also particularly representative examples of the different circumstances 
under which the German and the Italian biotech industry developed.
To begin with, the incentives to set up a biotech firm in Germany and Italy were dia-
metrically opposed. Whereas structural and financial support from the government 
provided positive incentives for company formation in Germany, the opposite was true 
for Italy, where biotech firms were often founded as a response to downsizing measures 
by pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, like many German biotech firms, Mela-
reen and Intrapharma were spin-offs from academic institutions (GerRPI1; GerRPI2), 
whereas Belle and Neverpharma grew out of existing pharmaceutical companies (ItRPI3; 
ItRPI1), as have almost all Italian biotech firms. Finally, company foundation took place 
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at different points in time. Like many German biotech companies, the two German 
firms were founded in the mid- and late1990s; the two Italian firms, like most of their 
national counterparts, were set up around the turn of the millennium.
Despite these discrepancies, German and Italian biotech firms in general, and these 
four examples in particular, agreed in their choice of competitive strategy. Aiming at 
the commercial development of radical inventions made within the organization from 
which the firms in question emerged, all newly founded companies decided to pursue 
RPI strategies (GerRPI1; GerRPI2; ItRPI3; ItRPI1). This decision was not affected by the 
extent to which national institutions provided the necessary input factors for RPI. In-
stead, the search for these factors came after the decision to establish an RPI company.
Strategy change over time
Three examples of strategy change complete the anecdotal evidence presented thus far. 
A German LCP strategist, which I shall call Aetherpharma GmbH, constitutes the first 
example. Until 2001, Aetherpharma was part of a larger pharmaceutical group, within 
which it pursued a DQP strategy. When the increasing need for innovative performance 
and flexibility led to the splitting of this group, Aetherpharma had to reconsider its stra-
tegic orientation. Following a prolonged period of reduced R&D efforts, Aetherphar-
ma’s discovery record was bleak. Because its poor R&D performance dashed hopes for 
early inventions, Aetherpharma decided to change its competitive strategy from DQP 
to LCP (GerLCP1). This decision demonstrates how technological opportunities and, 
more precisely, the prospect not to come up with marketable innovative products, influ-
enced the firm’s decision to change its strategy.
A similar example is provided by an Italian LCP strategist which, for reasons of con-
fidentiality, is referred to here as Glycerine SpA. Until the early 1990s, Glycerine was a 
typical marketing specialist in that it imitated, produced, registered, and marketed the 
products of other pharmaceutical firms. While pursuing these activities, Glycerine hap-
pened to discover a recombinant protein, which raised hopes for the development of 
superior products and, hence, for incremental innovation. In an attempt to exploit this 
technological opportunity commercially, Glycerine opened a small research centre and 
changed from an LCP to a DQP strategy. But this change in general, and pharmaceuti-
cal development in particular, was not without problems. Although the R&D activities 
of Glycerine translated into several patents and international research collaborations, 
the firm became aware that it lacked both the financial means and the technological 
expertise to develop its discovery into a marketable product. Consequently, it decided to 
stop its R&D efforts and closed the research centre (ItLCP1). In other words, Glycerine 
changed from a DQP back to an LCP strategy – roughly ten years after its first strategy 
change. Like the experience of Aetherpharma, the change from LCP to DQP, and vice 
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versa, was instigated by technological opportunities: namely, the firm’s hope, then inca-
pacity, to turn a pharmaceutical invention into a marketable product.
The final example of strategy change is again provided by an Italian firm, which I shall 
call Allpharma SpA. Unlike the two previous cases, Allpharma changes – and changes 
back – its competitive strategy from DQP to RPI. This approach is possible because 
the firm’s R&D activities take place at two levels. Having been among the first Italian 
firms to open their own R&D laboratories, the national research facilities of Allpharma 
constitute the basis for the firm’s usual activities in incremental product innovation. 
Furthermore, Allpharma is one of the founding members of an exclusive, private Eu-
ropean research alliance established in 1989. Having the explicit aim of facilitating the 
‘joint research and development of innovative pharmaceutical products’ (ItDQP1), this 
research network occasionally serves as a platform for the development of Allpharma’s 
radical innovations. More concretely, Allpharma occasionally makes radical discoveries 
while pursuing its traditional DQP activities. Seizing these technological opportunities, 
the firm temporarily changes its strategy from DQP to RPI by relying extensively on its 
international research partners. Once the latter have helped to transform the radical 
invention into marketable patents, or even products, Allpharma changes back to incre-
mental innovation and proceeds with product improvements (ItDQP1).
In sum, technological opportunities are a central concern of entrepreneurs when choos-
ing their firm’s strategy in two respects. First, the firms discussed here differ in all par-
ticulars but one: their strategy choice was driven by the prospect not to be inventive or, 
rather, to develop a radical or incremental invention into a marketable product. Second, 
all ‘strategy changers’ chose a new strategy that was technologically close to the former 
one. Firms switched from LCP to DQP strategies, and vice versa. They also changed 
back and forth from DQP to RPI strategies. However, not one firm switched from RPI 
to LCP, or the other way round. The decision to choose a new strategy that corresponds 
to the firm’s former technological expertise underlines how important technological 
considerations are for the strategy choices of pharmaceutical firms.
5 Discussion and conclusions
What do the analyses presented in this paper teach us about the success and choice of 
competitive strategies pursued in the pharmaceutical industry? Contrary to the central 
argument of the national competitiveness literature (see footnotes 1 to 3), entrepreneurs 
do not seem to base their choice of competitive strategy on institutional considerations. 
Rather than pursue a particular strategy because it is facilitated by national institutions 
providing specific input factors, entrepreneurs instead decide to take up RPI, DQP, or 
LCP strategies irrespective of their firm’s institutional environment (section 2). Inter-
estingly and, again, contrary to the expectations of national competitiveness scholars 
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(see footnote 4), entrepreneurs are not punished for pursuing strategies that receive no 
institutional support, as neither the success nor the sustainability of competitive strate-
gies seems to be dependent on national institutions providing the required input factors 
(section 3).
Although alternative explanations for strategy success go beyond the scope of this par-
ticular paper, I have sought to develop an alternative explanation for strategy choice on 
the basis of qualitative evidence, in that systematic comparison of interviews with CEOs 
and managers suggests that technological opportunities are a crucial factor when en-
trepreneurs decide which competitive strategy to pursue. When the prospect of inven-
tions is limited, entrepreneurs opt for LCP strategies. When chances of developing an 
incremental or radical invention into a marketable product are reasonable, they instead 
choose to pursue RPI or DQP strategies (section 4).
These insights challenge contributions to the national competitiveness literature, which 
depict firms as institution-takers.26 By arguing that firms choose their strategy in line 
with national institutions that provide the necessary types of finance and labour qualifi-
cations, the literature attributes important constraining capacities to these financial- and 
labour-market institutions. This idea is underlined by the reasoning that firms choos-
ing to pursue strategies without institutional support are less successful and, thus, not 
sustainable over time.27 The previous analyses have, however, shown that firms behave 
like Schumpeterian entrepreneurs rather than constrained institution-takers, which 
becomes apparent from the following reasoning. Schumpeter draws a crucial distinc-
tion between entrepreneurs and managers (Schumpeter 1934: 74–94; Schumpeter 1939: 
103–106; Schumpeter 1947) in that 
the defining characteristic [of the entrepreneur] is simply the doing of new things or the doing 
of things that are already being done in a new way (innovation). … [Thereby,] the ‘new thing’ 
need not be spectacular or of historic importance. It need not be Bessemer steel or the explosion 
motor. It can be the Deerfoot sausage. (Schumpeter 1947: 151)
Contrary to this, a manager merely ‘head[s] the administration of a going concern’ 
(ibid.). Entrepreneurs thus possess the necessary creativity to pursue new business ideas 
and ‘to cope with the resistances and difficulties which action always meets with outside 
of the ruts of established practice’ (ibid.: 152). Managers lack that creative capacity.
Although I have used the notion of ‘firms’ throughout this paper as an umbrella term 
for ‘managers’ and ‘entrepreneurs,’ Schumpeter’s distinction indicates that firms gain 
competitiveness because they are ‘entrepreneurial,’ not because they are ‘managed’ 
(Schumpeter 1934, 1939). We have seen that firms are competitive because entrepre-
neurs deliberately consider their firm’s individual technological opportunities when 
26 See, in particular, Porter (1990); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Hall/Soskice (2001b); Amable (2003); Hall/
Gingerich (2004); Casper (2007); Hancké et al. (2007).
27 See footnote 4.
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choosing its competitive strategy. In the same vein, we have seen that entrepreneurs do 
not let their strategy choice be driven by the institutional environment of their compa-
ny. Thus, corporate competitiveness results from the independence and creativeness of 
entrepreneurs rather than the institution-driven implementation of strategies through 
managers.
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Appendix
Table A.1 RPI, DQP, and LCP in the UK
Company name Technology focus Firm age Competitive strategy
Acambis Biotech 12 RPI
Amarin Biotech 15 RPI
Antisoma Biotech 16 RPI
CRT (Cancer Res Tech.) Trad. pharma 41 RPI
Celltech Group Biotech 24 RPI
CeNeS Biotech 7 RPI
Henderson Morley Biotech 8 RPI
Imperial Cancer Res. Trad. pharma 102 RPI
KS Biomedix Biotech n.a. RPI
Onyvax Biotech 7 RPI
Pharmagene Biotech 7 RPI
PowderJect Biotech 11 RPI
Protherics Biotech 5 RPI
Scotia Biotech 20 RPI
SkyePharma Biotech 8 RPI
Xenova Biotech 17 RPI
AstraZeneca Trad. pharma 91 RPI & DQP
GlaxoSmithKline Trad. pharma 174 RPI & DQP
Shire Trad. pharma 18 RPI & DQP
Amersham Pharmacia Biotech Trad. pharma n.a. DQP
Axis Genetics Biotech n.a. DQP
Bioglan Biotech 72 DQP
Britannia Trad. pharma 23 DQP
British Biotech Biotech 18 DQP
Cambridge Antibody Technology Biotech 14 DQP
Crusade Laboratories Biotech 5 DQP
DevCo Trad. pharma 5 DQP
Galen Trad. pharma 36 DQP
Napp Trad. pharma 81 DQP
Nycomed Amersham Trad. pharma 130 DQP
Oxford Glyco Sciences Biotech n.a. DQP
Provalis Biotech 7 DQP
Smith & Nephew Trad. pharma 73 DQP
Allergy Therapeutics Trad. Pharma 70 LCP
Biopharm (UK) Biotech n.a. LCP
Cambridge Lab.s Trad. pharma 17 LCP
Virogen Biotech n.a. LCP
Source: PHID (November 2004). 
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Table A.2 RPI, DQP, and LCP in Germany
Company name Technology focus Firm age Competitive strategy
BASF Trad. pharma 139 RPI
Curacyte Biotech 5 RPI
GPC Biotech Biotech 7 RPI
Jerini Bio Tools Biotech 10 RPI
MediGene Biotech 10 RPI
Merz Trad. pharma 96 RPI
MorphoSys Biotech 12 RPI
Scil Biomedicals Biotech 5 RPI
Wilex Biotechnology Biotech 7 RPI
ASTA Medica Trad. pharma 169 RPI & DQP
Bayer Trad. pharma 141 RPI & DQP
Boehringer Ingelheim Trad. pharma 119 RPI & DQP
Schering AG Trad. pharma 133 RPI & DQP
Altana Trad. Pharma 27 DQP
Degussa Trad. pharma 5 DQP
Falk Trad. pharma 44 DQP
GLE Medicon Trad. pharma n.a. DQP
Gruenenthal Trad. pharma 58 DQP
Jenapharm Trad. pharma 54 DQP
Madaus Trad. pharma 85 DQP
Medac Biotech 34 DQP
Merck KGaA Trad. pharma 336 DQP
Merckle Trad. pharma 59 DQP
Paion Biotech 4 DQP
Revotar Biotech 4 DQP
Schwarz Pharma Trad. pharma 58 DQP
Plantorgan Trad. pharma 30 LCP
Schwabe Trad. pharma 138 LCP
Strathmann Trad. pharma 30 LCP
Source: PHID (November 2004).
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Table A.3 RPI, DQP, and LCP in Italy
Company name Technology focus Firm age Competitive strategy
Abiogen Biotech 7 RPI
Alfa Wassermann Trad. pharma 56 RPI
Ausonia n.a. n.a. RPI
Istituto di Ricerche Sigma 
Tau
Trad. pharma 19 RPI
Medioloanum Trad. pharma 32 RPI
Poli Trad. pharma 25 RPI
Rotta Research Biotech 43 RPI
SPA Trad. pharma 57 RPI
Bracco Trad. pharma 77 RPI & DQP
Menarini Trad. pharma 118 RPI & DQP
Fidia Trad. pharma 58 DQP
Bruno Trad. pharma n.a. DQP
Chiesi Trad. pharma 69 DQP
Dompe Trad. pharma 64 DQP
Eurand Trad. pharma 35 DQP
Geymonat Trad. pharma 76 DQP
Italpharmaco Trad. pharma 66 DQP
Recordati Trad. pharma 78 DQP
Zambon Trad. pharma 98 DQP
Biotoscana Biotech n.a. LCP
Formenti Trad. pharma 50 LCP
Guidotti Trad. pharma 90 LCP
Lusopharmaco Trad. pharma 53 LCP
Mipharm Trad. pharma 6 LCP
Neopharmed Trad. pharma n.a. LCP
Rottapharm Trad. pharma 43 LCP
Segix Trad. pharma 42 LCP
Source: PHID (November 2004).
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